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COMMENT
By PAUL H.

CASHMAN*

I

FIND the paper by Dean McKay incisive and helpful, and I
think my comments will be in the nature of a supplementary
rather than a differing point of view.
It seems clear that the conflict between the rights of the student
as a private person and the expectations of him in his student role
by the institution are often at the heart of a campus crisis. Dean
McKay correctly suggests the central question: What is the extent to
which the university should treat its students as private citizens? My
own view is that we need to examine some of the assumptions
underlying the decision to treat the student as a student or as a
private citizen. Some of those assumptions are expressed directly by
Dean McKay, and some are implied.
One common assumption is that the university has a stake in
behavior when its "public image" is involved. Note that this is one
of the bases for off-campus behavior control suggested by Dean
McKay. I have serious reservations about judgments based on a
public relations concept of the university. What is good public
relations today is bad public relations tomorrow. A decision to protect the public image can be based on a rather foggy notion of public
response. Even at best, such decisions sometimes appear to violate
sound educational judgment.
An example of a public image decision is the tendency of some
institutions to disapprove the appearance of certain speakers on the
campus. The free speech of a democratic society is critical to its
existence and should not yield to public pressures. A second example
is the off-campus rally which attracts negative attention in the downtown community. In both of these cases, and in many others, it would
be far better to make the decision on educational grounds and to
face the public relations problems as a separate matter. In fact, we
university administrators ought to recognize that we are spending
more time worrying about our public image than interpreting our
point of view to our constituency. We need to educate the community
to our goals and methods- not to alter those methods and goals
in order to preserve an ethereal image.
A second assumption made by universities is that there is a
clearcut distinction between on-campus and off-campus behavior.
I am convinced that such a sharp delineation cannot be made
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geographically. To be sure, there is more latitude for judgment about
what does or does not constitute disruption and disturbance on the
campus than sometimes is possible off the campus. I am equally
certain that Dean McKay is quite right in arguing that the student
should not enter a sanctuary from consequences for civil wrongs
when he enters the university.
Clearly, the student should not be free of community sanctions
simply because he is a student. There may, however, be room for
some latitude in timing or method. The reluctance on the part of
police to enter a classroom and arrest a student is an excellent example. But, despite some room for flexibility in application, both
campus and community must exist under the same laws.
What becomes more difficult is the application (or nonapplication) of university expectations off the campus. For instance, universities often formulate rules about hours for students living on campus
which do not equally apply to students living off campus. What we
university administrators appear to do in some cases is to assume
a much stronger role with on-campus students than with those offcampus, as if the role of student is a mantle which he dons and doffs
at the gate. Where we cannot employ a strong role with off-campus
behavior, we sometimes seem to employ the fiction that we are applying standards equally by announcing that all our policies are also applicable off-campus. In my judgment, what is expected of the student
in terms of behavior on the campus should also be expected away
from campus. Conversely, standards which cannot or should not be
applied by the university to off-campus behavior should not be
regulated on-campus. The fictions which are employed may protect
us from the public relations consequences of applying this distinction,
but the practice nevertheless appears to be of questionable educational policy.
There are two criteria which should apply to any suggestion
that the student be subject to special expectations beyond those he
accepts as a citizen. First, is this expectation necessary to the educational community of which he is a part? Second, is this expectation
one which is consistent with the basic rights of any citizen? In general, institutions have not agreed on special expectations of students
by virtue of their membership in the educational community. We
have some broad generalized statements, but too few of them have
been reduced to concrete policy. In this sense, Dean McKay's suggestions about tolerance of dissent are helpful, and in my opinion
should apply on and off the campus. It may well be that faculty
members in some professional areas will want to assert some specific
expectations. Indeed, some colleges and departments do so. My point
is that such expectations, when developed, should apply to the
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student in whatever context he finds himself. My impression is that
we have too many special expectations that cannot stand the test of
the first criterion above, and that we apply those expectations on a
geographical basis to the detriment of whatever principle is involved.
A third assumption which requires attention is that orderly
behavior is a primary goal of university policies. While I should not
like to be described as one advocating disorder as a university goal,
I urge that an orderly campus not be made too great a consideration
in working with students. A university education is, or should be, an
unsettling experience. With that instability ought to come some
changes in the order of things. Thus, a stable campus should give
cause for uneasiness.
Order for its own sake is not desirable. Business office procedures may be orderly, but they may not necessarily produce the best
educational results. We need to stimulate a certain amount of new
procedures and new tensions. I have watched Edmund Williamson,
Dean of Students at the University of Minnesota, do this repeatedly
over the years with gratifying results. I hope our focus on the question of private rights and students' rights will not cause us to try to
develop an orderly arrangement which hides the educational issues.
For example, the argument about whether or not institutions ought
to have any expectations for students beyond those of the society
outside the university can be resolved by an easy formula, yet the
argument itself hides one of the most significant philosophical
questions in higher education, deserving solemn consideration
beyond the cursory solution.
A fourth assumption upon which universities often proceed is
that considerable flexibility must be maintained in dealing with
violations of some university policies, particularly in those areas
where essential university activities are involved. I was glad to see
Dean McKay stress the "overstepping of bounds" allowable in the
academic community. A university ought to be a place where mistakes are possible - and where a new point of departure can be set.
Normally, regulations do not approach the final truth in this world,
and we need to recognize their imperfections. If a university rule
prohibits "disruption of campus events," we need to interpret the
word "disruption" with as much generosity as possible, and we
need to give one who disrupts within the meaning of the term an
opportunity to learn he has done so. I strongly support the assumption that flexibility of interpretation must be maintained; failing to
do so results in a harsh, regulation bound climate in which little true
dialogue can be established among members of the university community.
I do not wish to end my response to Dean McKay's paper with-
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out a consideration of the role of campus police. Historically, the
policeman on the campus was an arm of the university administration, usually the business office, who performed certain administrative
functions. Many campus police departments developed out of an
arrangement where one custodian on the night crew was asked to
watch the buildings. Gradually, he did not do any custodial work,
and he received a badge, a uniform, and perhaps a gun. His function
was to protect the buildings, and he continued to be an arm of plant
services.
This is no longer the case with campus police. More commonly,
good departments see their function as one of serving students by
helping to maintain an educational environment on the campus.
They work to protect dissenters from nondissenters; to keep the
public from intruding into campus events and disrupting them; to
help maintain efficient campus events, and so on. Less than formerly,
they try to protect individual students from the law of the community, although they may enforce law on the campus or community
in order to prevent two sets of police from appearing at the
university.
This is the basic role I see for police- the support of a productive educational environment. This requires special training and
special attitudes. It requires an attention to educational interaction
rather than the protection of property alone. I see signs indicating
that some departments have moved in this direction. What is needed
is educational direction, and such direction will, of itself, end the
notion that campus police are either the special pleader of students
or the arm of the local police on the campus.
Dean McKay has identified in his paper some important insights on the student as a private citizen. My own view is that he
implies - and I think quite correctly - that the university should
set up as few special exceptions as possible for the student. To the
extent allowable in the academic community, the student should be
regarded as a private citizen, and any additional responsibilities
clearly should be identified as necessary for educational considerations. In this way, higher education can maintain a proper role for
its students.

